UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA * Case No. 23-CR-82(EK)

*

* Brooklyn, New York
* January 18, 2024

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CARLOS WATSON, et al.,

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Defendants.

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TRANSCRIPT OF CRIMINAL CAUSE FOR STATUS CONFERENCE
BEFORE THE HONORABLE ERIC R. KOMITEE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

APPEARANCES:

V.

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1 (Proceedings commenced at 2:08 p.m.) 2 THE CLERK: Criminal cause for status conference, 3 docket no. 23-CR-82, USA vs. Watson, et al. Counsel, please state your appearances for the record, beginning with the 4 5 government. MR. SIEGEL: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Jonathan 6 7 Siegel and Dylan Stern for the United States. MR. SULLIVAN: And Ronald Sullivan on behalf of 8 9 Carlos Watson. 10 MR. MONTGOMERY: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Kenneth Montgomery on behalf of Ozy Media. 11 12 THE COURT: Good afternoon, everyone. And Mr. 1.3 Watson, good afternoon. 14 MR. SULLIVAN: And Mr. Watson is present I forgot 15 to say, for the record, yes. 16 THE COURT: All right. So we are here for a status 17

conference.

As you all know, the government submitted a letter that I think is helpful in terms of framing the agenda.

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The most important reason that we're gathered here today is to make sure that the trial schedule continues to be met.

So my agenda is two, I don't think there's anything for me to do on this question of privilege logs at this point. There's a suggestion from the government, which is

not the party best positioned to know this, but I which I appreciate anyway, that Mr. Watson's counsel may have some interest in withdrawing as counsel. And obviously, we need to deal with that.

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I'll talk about the status of pretrial motions a bit and we'll set a calendar for motions in limine.

And then there's the question of whether to modify the protective order and if so, how.

Can we start with the question of representation, Mr. Sullivan? Is there anything you want to say on that subject?

MR. SULLIVAN: I am here for the duration.

Whatever happens I think those conversations flowed out the California litigation.

The proposition I was making is that depending on when that judge resolves those issues, I cannot in good faith represent that I'll be able to provide constitutionally adequately representation as defined by the Sixth Amendment, unless this -- the California judge keeps moving its decision back and back and back. It was supposed to be in December.

Now we're up to February 16th, but there are some things that need to get done. I can lawyer this case but there are other things that just have to get done in order to ensure that Mr. Watson has constitutionally adequate representation.

I will finish this thing pro bono. That's no problem. But with a million case -- million document case we need to get experts, or at least an expert.

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I'm paying enormous sums of money for a document management system right now. I may or may not get it back. So things have to change in order for us be able to go forward.

So that's just a little context but I'm here. I'm here and I'll be here on May 20th.

THE COURT: Okay. When you reference the California case, I take that to be litigation with an insurer about whether defense fees will be paid and if so, to whom. That is what it is.

I appreciate your confirmation that you will be here regardless. As you and everybody else in the courtroom will remember I permitted the substitution out of prior counsel and in with you as counsel based on, and very much dependent on your assurance that you would indeed meet the trial schedule that we have set out.

I understand, even as unlikely as I would be to seriously contemplate any substitution of counsel at this point I am, of course, aware of the financial pressures associated with defending a complex, white collar criminal case like this one.

And I don't want to prejudge anything. I don't

know exactly how the CJA plan in this district would work under these precise circumstances, but if your client reaches a point in which he is truly unable to pay for his defense, you know, one potential avenue is that he puts together a financial affidavit, applies for some relief under the Criminal Justice Act, whether that's fees to you or dispensation for experts or other specialists or otherwise.

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Again, I don't know if that's a fully viable option but it sounds to me like something worth at least exploring.

All right. Is there anything else the government wants to say at this point about the representation question?

MR. SIEGEL: No, Your Honor. Thank you.

THE COURT: Okay. Can the government tell me then what's the bigger picture behind this dispute over the protective order?

What are these materials, to the extent it's relevant? What do you know about who disclosed them? And when I say who, I don't mean which team. I mean which person on that team and why are those particular materials sensitive, or potentially sensitive.

I understand there are concerns present when a protective order is violated irrespective of how we quantify the ensuing harm. But what's really going on here is my question.

MR. SIEGEL: So I think there's the narrow issue

and there's the larger issue.

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The narrow issue of the three -- I think it's two or three emails that we've identified that were quoted in the complaint, those are emails between the CEO of BuzzFeed and the publisher -- the then publisher of BuzzFeed news.

So those are high level conversations between executives at a victim company that we received as part of the investigation and that we produced --

THE COURT: I'm sorry. Emails from the time period when that was a -

MR. SIEGEL: Yes, they were emails about BuzzFeed's potential acquisition of Ozy, which is one of the fraudulent incidents that we allege in the indictment.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. SIEGEL: The emails between those executives were quoted in Ozy's civil complaint. When we saw that we reached out to counsel, Mr. Sullivan and Mr. Montgomery. They assured us that they were not the ones who disclosed it.

We asked them to follow up with their clients to see if their clients had disclosed and they responded, and their email is attached to their letter, that these were inadvertently disclosed to Mr. Watson's lawyers for Mr. Watson's civil suit.

What we don't know is were those the only two emails that were produced, that were disclosed to the civil

lawyers, or was all of the discovery, or all of the discovery related to BuzzFeed or some other set disclosed to the civil lawyers in connection with the civil suit.

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We only know about the ones that were quite clearly quoted.

THE COURT: What stage is that litigation at? Premotion to dismiss, post?

MR. SIEGEL: The complaint was just filed in late December. I don't think there's been any answer or a motion to dismiss at this time.

So in terms of what has been disclosed, we know what's at a minimum. We don't know how far the issue goes, but it's clearly indicative to us of a breakdown of the way the protective order is supposed to work.

In terms of who disclosed it, what we know is what we've been told by defense counsel. Under the protective order it's only supposed to be defense counsel and their clients who can have it, as well as experts and certain people who are listed in the complaint, none of whom would be civil counsel in a case like this.

And our understanding, from what we've been told by defense counsel, is that it was Mr. Watson who disclosed it.

This is Mr. Watson's civil suit. These are Mr. Watson's lawyers. So that's our understanding of what the issue is.

And the concerns that that raises for us is not

just these specific documents, but whether the protective order is functioning as it needs to for this protective order to work, whether the court's order is being followed and the larger pattern that this falls into, that we've seen throughout this investigation, of Mr. Watson going after people who are cooperating with this investigation.

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THE COURT: Going after them you're saying by filing the litigation against BuzzFeed.

MR. SIEGEL: Well, in this instant it's using BuzzFeed's own documents, which we received in this investigation, to file this lawsuit against BuzzFeed and Ben Smith, who's the reporter who originally broke the story against Ozy.

THE COURT: And he was a potential witness in this case?

MR. SIEGEL: At this time I don't anticipate that we would call Ben Smith, but witnesses from BuzzFeed will be called.

THE COURT: Okay. He was the CEO at the time of BuzzFeed?

MR. SIEGEL: Ben Smith was the publisher of BuzzFeed. The CEO was Jonah Peretti.

THE COURT: Okay. I'm having a copy of the protective order printed now.

MR. SIEGEL: I have a copy that I can hand up if

that would be helpful.

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THE COURT: That would be helpful indeed.

Apart from a revocation of bail, what else is the government seeking by way of relief at this point?

MR. SIEGEL: So, Your Honor, I think the first thing that we're requesting is the modification of the protective order as laid out in our letter.

We designed this protective order to be fairly liberal as to Mr. Watson's access to the documents. There aren't limitations to his ability to review anything, his ability to possess things, which we were comfortable with because there was a protective order that he signed and we anticipated he would follow.

What we're proposing is a modification to make it so that he can't have documents that are really third party documents in his possession.

He would still be able to review all those documents, but he would have to review them with counsel, or with counsel's staff, and they would have to be possessed by counsel so that counsel would have the responsibility to ensuring that they're not being produced.

In terms of documents from Ozy, documents that were produced by Mr. Watson, documents that are really documents about Mr. Watson or Ozy, such as their tax records, their bank records, their phone records, we're not proposing that

there be any limitations on those.

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But things that are third party documents that relate to witnesses, that related to victims in light of the fact that these documents were disclosed and published, we think it's appropriate to restrict Mr. Watson's unfettered access to that.

THE COURT: So obviously what your proposal runs the risk of bumping up against is the situation we just talked about a moment ago with respect to potential financial pressures affecting the fullness potentially of the representation here. We'll see how that plays out.

But one reason I think that complex white collar cases can go forward, even when they're not being lawyered in the somewhat traditional large law firm mode, is that the defendant, who is a highly educated person himself and knows the documents perhaps better than anyone else who's going to be associated with this case, can assist in reviewing documents and identifying those that are relevant, either to the defense theory of the case or to rebutting the government theory of the case.

And so I think we need for this to play out in a little bit more detail before I take a step like the one you're urging on me right now.

Obviously, Mr. Sullivan and maybe more importantly Mr. Watson, a protective order in place from the court is not

something to be disregarded.

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But it might help me to know a little bit more about the circumstances pursuant to which this course of action unfolded.

How many documents are we talking about, and to the extent you agree that those documents -- the sharing of those documents was restricted by a protective order, why is it that they appear to have been shared nevertheless had that eventuality come to pass.

If the defense can get me a letter on that subject within a reasonable time period, let's call it a week from Monday, that will help me think through the question of next steps here.

I'm not prejudging either of the government's applications, either the modification of the protective order or the question about bail. I don't think we're really heading for a detention hearing anytime very soon.

Think about what other measures, short of the ones you've proposed so far, might bring you some solace, if not everything you're hoping for.

And I don't want to revisit the basis for the protective order in full. I think it was consented to by both sides and so there wasn't really a lot of contested briefing on the issue, but as to these materials that you see quoted in the civil suit, give me a real world assessment in three

sentences or less of what the actual harm associated with this disclosure is.

Is it just the obvious that I can hypothesize that now Mr. Watson's able to put together a civil complaint that includes allegations he would not otherwise have had access to or is there something more severe and specific you can say about that?

MR. SIEGEL: Your Honor, in terms of these documents specifically, I think the concern that's raised by these documents specifically, it's really the broader, general concern about the protective order and the way the protective order is meant to work.

The protective order that we have here is a very common one that's been blessed by courts, including Your Honor, and we cited law for that when we made our application, to provide the blanket protection for a large number of documents, which in this case largely come from victims, but to have a process by which anything that the defense thinks ought to not be protected or ought to be public, that they can do that.

That process was entirely ignored and --

THE COURT: Okay. I understand the general interest but you're not suggesting to me now that there's been a disclosure of bona fide trade secrets.

MR. SIEGEL: No, Your Honor.

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THE COURT: Or that someone's personal identifying information or medical information has been disclosed, or any of the things we would think of first when we think of the need for sealing and protective orders.

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I can't remember exactly how many rounds we went through -- so you may have noticed I'm in the business of occasionally rejecting protective orders sua sponte, or calling for additional briefing in respect of their necessity and legal appropriateness.

And so it may be relevant as we get letters from the defense and maybe a follow up letter from the government, whether and to what extent the specific materials disclosed meet the standard for who protective orders are appropriate in the first place.

I'm not saying that's dispositive of anything, but it may be something of interest to me.

MR. SIEGEL: Sure. And Your Honor I think I can answer that.

You know, the government is aware that Your Honor is, I think, you know -- as you noted, you're very careful about protective orders and you take the obligation to find good cause seriously.

That's why in making our application we provided law, including cases that have entered similar protective --

THE COURT: You provide law, but you don't explain

in infinitesimal detail what every single document that's going to be subject to the protective order consists of.

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You know, these protective orders get litigated at a relatively high level of generality where the government says here are the kinds of privacy interests that are implicated and the documents that are going to be subject to this protective order present those -- you know, those interests are implicated with respect to the documents we're going to be producing.

But you don't demonstrate that on a document by document basis, right?

And so I think this whole conversation is proceeding on the assumption, which is for me right now is just an assumption, that these documents we're talking about implicate the interest that led to the imposition of the protective order in the first place.

Again, people shouldn't violate protective orders, whether they're over broad or not, but I haven't lost -- just because the protective order has been entered doesn't mean that I've lost all interest in the subject of whether this one is potentially over broad or isn't. And I think I'll leave it at that.

The government has its Rule 16 disclosure obligations, which you have to make, whether there's a protective order in place or not.

1 It's I guess nice that the parties here were able 2 to work out a protective order that everybody agreed to, but 3 as I'm sure I indicated in this case and others, there are additional interests implicated as well. All right. We'll leave that question at that. 5 Did I set a deadline for the -- I think I said a 6 7 week from Monday to --8 MR. SULLIVAN: The 29th by my calendar, yes. 9 THE COURT: Okay. And have I been clear enough on what I'm hoping to learn through that letter? 10 MR. SULLIVAN: Yes. 11 12 THE COURT: Okay. So that's the protective order 1.3 question. 14 MR. SIEGEL: I'm sorry, Your Honor. Do you want a 15 government response or --16 THE COURT: If you want to respond, you can. Ι'm not insisting on a government response. You should -- if 17 18 that letter is coming in on the 29th, respond by February 19 2nd, please. 20 So that's the protective order question. There is 21 a proposed schedule for the briefing of motions in limine, 22 which I think I'm advised is agreed to by both parties. 23 Motions in limine briefs by both sides March 8th. 24 Opposition March 29th and reply briefs April 12.

I really would like to have, if possible, one set

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of briefing on motions in limine.

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I know that it's sometimes hard to envision in advance every evidentiary issue that can come up in a long and complex trial, but A, I don't want to waste the jury's time any more than is absolutely unavoidable and B, I'd like all the motion in limine briefing to be contained in a single set rather than having an iterative process as we go.

And so if anybody needs an extension of page limits, that's fine. Ask for it now. But do try to envision as comprehensively as possible the objections that you expect I will need to resolve.

So that briefing schedule on motions in limine is ordered.

What's next from the government's perspective?

MR. SIEGEL: Your Honor, there's the date for expert disclosures. The government is flexible on that.

We would submit that it's appropriate to have that before the motions in limine are due so that if there's any motions about those expert disclosures, we can address them in the motions in limine.

THE COURT: What can you -- I mean, you've had discovery on experts already, right?

MR. SIEGEL: No, Your Honor. This is the deadline for discovery on experts.

THE COURT: I'm sorry. I'm just going to look at

1 Rule 16 for a moment. 2 (Pause.) 3 THE COURT: Rule 16(a)(1)(G) says "If the 4 government requests discovery, under the second bullet point 5 in (b)(1)(C)(1) and the defendant complies, then the government must, at the defendant's request, disclose all its 6 7 expert testimony. What's the history here in terms of -- nobody's 8 9 disclosed anything by way of expert testimony? 10 MR. SIEGEL: Your Honor, I'm just pulling it up right now. 11 12 I think in that same provision that you're looking at -- so this is (g) Roman number II, the time to disclose. 1.3 14 The court by order or local rule must set a time for the 15 government to make its disclosures. And then there's a parallel rule for the defense to make their disclosures. 16 17 THE COURT: Right. 18 MR. SIEGEL: So that's what we're asking. 19 asking for the court to set a time for us to make those disclosures and for the defense to make those disclosures. 20 21 And then there's a parallel rule for the defense to 22 make their disclosures. 23 THE COURT: Right. Okay. 24 MR. SIEGEL: And as of now no such disclosures have

gone either way to date.

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THE COURT: That's right. And you propose -- sorry, what time frame?

MR. SIEGEL: We propose before the motions in limine so that if there are any issues that anyone wants to raise in a motion, we can address those in the motions in limine.

THE COURT: So if the motions in limine are forthcoming on -- what did we say, March 8th?

MR. SIEGEL: Yes.

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THE COURT: We would be talking about two or three weeks before then, presumably. What's the defense position in this, if anything?

MR. SULLIVAN: We cannot make a representation with respect to that. Our ability to secure our experts have been retarded by the California litigation.

THE COURT: What kinds of expert testimony might you contemplate if money was no object?

MR. SULLIVAN: Well, knowing that money is always an object, but we will need at least an expert to explain to the jury the nature of the venture capital world.

That it's different from PE. That the people who enter this world they -- what business people call bluff.

What lawyers call mere puffery, that they make claims about the nature of their products. Everything and everybody is going to create the next Microsoft, the next big thing.

Unlike PE, north of 70 percent of their projects zero out. They absolutely fail.

That's the nature of this industry and that's why I have this fancy cell phone now, because people take chances on things and they fail most of the time. Absolutely inconceivable for private equity, right. I mean, fail 70 percent of the time makes no sense.

So we're going to proffer an expert that's going to explain the nature of our early funding, start ups, venture capitalism. There is mounds of literature in the academic business journals about the difference between the two.

We'll be able to justify the proffer.

But that is at least one expert that we're going to put forward.

THE COURT: So, again, not prejudging anything, but as I sit here right now I'm struggling a little bit to comprehend the relevance of statistics, expert testimony, whatever, about the percentage of start ups that fail.

The allegations are not that Mr. Watson committed a crime by operating a business that failed. The allegations are that he made specific, or aided and abetted or conspired to make specific misrepresentations about the then current performance of his company by reference to a number of objective metrics.

Like specifically how much money they were earning

and how many videos were being watched by how many unique pairs of eyeballs and whatever else.

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And so I'm going to set the deadline of -- let's call it two weeks before March 8th for expert disclosure under Rule 16, and even if you don't have a specific expert engaged by that point, it might behoove you, I don't know, to say as much as you can about what the testimony you envision eliciting is, even with the identity of the witness to be disclosed later.

MR. SULLIVAN: Right. That we can do.

And just for Your Honor's knowing, it's not a question of specific representations. It's a question of material misrepresentations. And I think it's analogous to the -- quite analogous to the residential backed securities fraud cases.

I've won those early ones in Connecticut and the Second Circuit, Litvak and others came down and talked about how specific the norms are for that industry. How that industry operates and judges have been giving bad instructions before the Second Circuit kicked back Litvak. And so that's the nature.

Whether -- to the extent there's a misrepresentation, the question is what counts as a material misrepresentation, and that is quite industry specific and quite different from PE.

But that time frame I can represent that I can produce at least a summary of the literature and what we would intend to introduce.

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I doubt very seriously with the new date in California, which just got kicked back to February 16th, two days ago, that we will have retained a particular expert at that point.

THE COURT: Yeah. My memory of the Litvak case is I would say limited even in the first instance and has faded since.

But I thought it had to do more with alleged misrepresentations that, at least from the defense perspective, did not speak to the intrinsic value of the asset in question, right?

So it was like a bond and somebody would say oh, this is in my inventory or this is an agency transaction and the misrepresentations were about -- you know, from whom at what price the seller had obtained the asset?

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$ SULLIVAN: No, it was more representations about the acquisition price.

So the broker/dealers --

THE COURT: That's what I thought I was just saying.

MR. SULLIVAN: Their fee was the difference between the acquisition price and the sale price. And some

broker/dealers were saying, you know, I bought it at 10 when they really bought it at 8. So they were increasing their fees by two points.

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And the question was whether that's a material misrepresentation and the court -- in the end the courts had to instruct people about what constitutes -- what does a reasonable investor rely on in that industry when people are talking about their acquisition prices.

And in the end Litvak -- Litvak two I believe came back the day we acquitted my guy on this very same issue. And we got the instruction and we got the expert that talked about the fact that at the time our NBS was simply the wild, wild west. Virtually unregulated and that these multi-billion dollar companies had a room full of applied math majors in the back valuing these assets.

And that they did not reasonably rely on the representation of the broker/dealer for something like the acquisition price.

Now a jury was free to decide whether or not they thought it was material, but the jury had a right to know whether in that industry reasonable investors, particularly these huge hedgefunds, that's who bought these things, relied on those sorts of representations.

So if you go to a car lot and the used car lot

1 says, Judge, this grandmother -- elderly grandmother only 2 drove the car --3 THE COURT: I understand. MR. SULLIVAN: -- you don't -- you get a Carfax. 4 You have your own way to value that car and it's not 5 reasonable that -- you know, you can't go and sue the guy 6 7 if it's not true that only a grandmother drove it to and 8 from church everyday. 9 That's essentially what's going on in those cases, but I'll do a more fulsome writing of it. 10 THE COURT: Yes. I think that's called for. 11 12 MR. SIEGEL: Your Honor, I'm going to engage --1.3 14 THE COURT: We're not going to argue the motion 15 in limine now, yeah. 16 MR. SIEGEL: I agree. I'll leave that for our 17 papers. 18 But look, the concern I have is Mr. Sullivan said 19 that by the 23rd he could get us a summary, and what Rule 16 calls for is a lot more than a summary. The rule is --20 2.1 THE COURT: It's the qualifications of the expert 22 23 and so on. 24 MR. SIEGEL: And also --25 THE COURT: I'm not making any -- when I say to

Mr. Sullivan, just to be clear, that you should tell me by that date everything you can tell me, that's not a promise that whatever information he omits will not be a problem down the line for his request to call that witness.

But it may be that I can save everybody some trouble here if the proposed testimony, irrespective of who would give it, is so obviously irrelevant or legally improper otherwise that we can cross that issue off the list.

So let's leave it at that for now, but yes, everybody has to comply with the rules of discovery in their entirety irrespective of my invitation to make a partial submission.

What else from the government's perspective?

MR. SIEGEL: Your Honor, I mean, at some point
we'll have set a schedule for voir dire and jury
instruction submissions, but whatever is Your Honor's
standard schedule for that is fine with the government.

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THE COURT: I have a standard schedule that you will find in my individual rules document.

On that, if anybody thinks there's a need to vary that, they should let me know early.

I think the defendant has consented in this case to have a jury selected by a magistrate judge rather than

me. Is that --

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MR. SULLIVAN: I don't know, but I had no objection. That's the way I usually do it here.

THE COURT: Okay. What else?

MR. SIEGEL: Just the -- oh, sorry.

You said that it might make sense to make the application now for an extension on the page limitation for the motions in limine.

I haven't started writing the motions in limine so I don't know how long they'll be, but to avoid a last minute application on that I would request for both parties that we not have page limitations on the motions in limine to ensure that we can address everything.

THE COURT: No page limits? We'll just all submit -- no, I'm kidding. That's fine as long as it -- you know, yeah, I mean, you run the risk that if you submit a hundred pages of briefing that I think should have been 40, that I'll ask you to do the editing yourself.

But I think I'm fine to -- you're all -- to all of your good judgment for the moment.

MR. SIEGEL: Then the only other thing, Your Honor, is you said you wanted to address the outstanding motions.

THE COURT: Oh, just to say -- the only motion I

understand to be outstanding still from the defense side is the -- we'll call it the selective prosecution motion.

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I will get an answer out on that in due course, but everybody should assume for the time being that this case will be going to trial, notwithstanding that motion.

Let's pick a date for our next status conference. If we've got a trial date in May, maybe this next status conference is in March right after the motions in limine have come in. Somewhere around March 15 perhaps. So I'm thinking the week of March 11th. Maybe 2:30 on the 13th.

MR. SIEGEL: That works for the government.

MR. SULLIVAN: It works for Mr. Watson and Ozy.

THE COURT: Meaning Mr. Montgomery's on board as well.

MR. MONTGOMERY: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. So we will see you all on March 13th.

MR. SULLIVAN: I do -- if the court permits, I have just a couple of things.

THE COURT: Yeah, please.

MR. SULLIVAN: I just want the record to be clear.

I may have misheard the government but -- in its presentation. I did not say, nor anybody who worked or works for me, and neither did Mr. Montgomery say, that Mr. Watson disclosed anything. What we said is that

documents were inadvertently disclosed. What the government infers is what they infer.

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But to the extent I heard them say that his counsel said that he disclosed something that is inaccurate, I did not say that. I never said, would not say that, and did not say that. I just want to be crystal clear on that.

The second thing, if this discussion comes to fruition about the CJA bar, Your Honor listed off a number of things they may be able to help with. One was attorney's fees. Just as a former public defender, in good faith I would never accept CJA fees. Any fees we might need would be for experts and other things. I'll be fine, but we need other things desperately to finish the defense.

On Rule 16 if there is a technical violation of Rule 16 that could "cause us trouble down the line," I want to state very clearly on the record then that I will have not provided Mr. Watson an adequate -- constitutionally adequate defense under the Sixth Amendment.

The fourth thing I want to say is that I do not think it's useful, and it's completely antagonistic for our system of justice for the government to suggest that filing a civil suit in good faith is going after "victims."

If the suit wasn't filed in good faith, they should dismiss it and penalize everybody involved. But Mr.

Watson was the victim of what Ben Smith did. So if there's a victim here, he's sitting to my left.

And I don't think that the government should be saying he's going after. It gets (indiscernible) baits and all that other stuff but there's no substance to it. It think it's improper and it's unfortunate.

Fifth and finally, Your Honor, with respect to the protective order, I just want to say on behalf of my client and the entire team that we a hundred percent agree that a protective order is a protective order and it should be abided by and stop on that proposition.

I'd also like to echo what the court mused that the protective order by design and what formally was written and it is over inclusive, the notion was there are so many documents that we're going to produce an over inclusive protective order -- so the value served by that is one of expedience.

And you are correct, we didn't get into the substance of each and every prior counsel. We did not get into the substance of each and every document.

So I just want to echo that, Your Honor, and $\operatorname{\mathsf{--}}$

THE COURT: I may be entirely --

MR. SULLIVAN: -- nobody is flouting an order.

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THE COURT: -- correct, but -- even if I am correct about that, which I may well be, nevertheless, the appropriate course of action in the face of a protective order that you view as overboard is to come back to the court and ask for a modification, not to take it into your own hands.

MR. SULLIVAN: Absolutely. I can represent that no one did that, which reminds me the sort of 5A.

We have taken efforts to ensure that nothing like this happens again and I think that is -- I just want that on Your Honor's mind.

THE COURT: What are those efforts?

MR. SULLIVAN: So as Your Honor knows, in these cases we have well over a million dollars -- well over a million documents on a huge database. They're Ozy documents. They're Mr. Watson's telephone. They're Ozy business records. Everything on a database.

What I've asked our vendor to do is just put another designation on anything that we're received from the government because everything we receive from the government is subject to the protective order, hence the over inclusive nature.

So the documents at issue, as I understand it, there was nothing about those documents that would jump out at one as oh, this is the sort of things that's protected.

1 So now we will have a mark, an indication -- an electronic mark on everything that says produced by 2 3 government, protected. And I think that is a better prophylactic to ensure that nothing inadvertently slips through our process. 5 So that's something that the court might consider 6 7 alongside of the government's recommendation, which I think is a too aggressive response. That's all. 8 9 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. I'll look for the letters on that subject from both sides and we'll tie off 10 that loop hopefully in the near future. 11 12 Anything else from the defense side? 13 MR. SULLIVAN: Well, to not give a law professor a page limit, you might do that --14 15 THE COURT: Is a colossal mistake. MR. SULLIVAN: I will be cautious. 16 17 THE COURT: Thank you. Anything else from the 18 government's side? Do we have any -- I can't remember the 19 state of speedy trial exclusions. MR. SIEGEL: We've already excluded time through 20 2.1 the beginning of the trial. 22 THE COURT: Okay. Do you agree with that? 23 MR. SULLIVAN: Agree, yes.

THE COURT: Okay. Anything else from the

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government's side?

1	MR. SIEGEL: No. Thank you, Your Honor.
2	THE COURT: All right. We've got our path
3	forward charted here. Thank you, everyone, and we will be
4	adjourned.
5	MR. SULLIVAN: Thank you
6	(Proceedings adjourned at 2:56 p.m.)
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8	I, CHRISTINE FIORE, court-approved transcriber and
9	certified electronic reporter and transcriber, certify that
10	the foregoing is a correct transcript from the official
11	electronic sound recording of the proceedings in the above-
12	entitled matter.
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14	Christine Lione
15	January 22, 2024
16	Christine Fiore, CERT
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